Games with imperfect information are an interesting and important class of games. They include most card games (e.g., bridge and poker), as well as many economic and political models. Here, we investigate algorithms for solving imperfect information games expressed in their extensive (game-tree) form. In particular, we consider algorithms for the simplest form of solution | a pure-strategy equilibrium point. We introduce to the arti cial intelligence (AI) community a classic algorithm due to Wilson, that nds a pure-strategy equilibrium point in one-player games with perfect recall. Wilson's algorithm, which we call IMP-minimax, runs in time linear in the size of the game-tree searched. In contrast to Wilson's result, Koller & Meggido have shown that nding a pure-strategy equilibrium point in one-player games without perfect recall is NP-hard. Here, we provide another contrast to
Introduction
Games with imperfect information are an interesting and important class of games. They have been studied at length in the game theory literature. They include many important applications, for example:
Parlor games like bridge, poker and Clue. Economic models of labor-and-management negotiation, in which variables like future in ation rates are modeled probabilistically. A distributed computation in which the cooperating processors (each with its own input) make certain judgments whose e cacy is determined by the collective input (which is modeled probabilistically).
Game theorists have long known that imperfect information games, from the solution-theory viewpoint, are quite di erent from perfect information games (von Neumann 1928). Here we show that imperfect information games are also quite di erent from perfect information games from the computational viewpoint; yet ideas from the one class of games can be useful for the other class. In particular:
1. We extend results of Koller & Meggido (1992) to show that solving imperfect information games is NP-hard, 1 even when the input is the entire game tree to be searched. This stands in sharp contrast with perfect information games, where the classical minimax algorithm (Kuhn 1953; Shannon 1950; Zermelo 1913) , for example, is linear in the size of the game tree searched. 2. These results lead one to seek heuristics or special cases. To that end, we introduce to the arti cial intelligence (AI) community a classic algorithm due to Wilson (1972) that solves a special case; we point out that it can be modi ed for use as a natural heuristic in the general case. Wilson's algorithm, which we call IMP-minimax, is to imperfect information games as minimax is to perfect information games. We further introduce and analyze IMP-alpha-beta, which computes the same value as does IMP-minimax, but usually does so faster through pruning (i.e., not examining the value of some nodes). IMP-alpha-beta is to IMP-minimax as the powerful alpha-beta algorithm (Knuth and Moore 1975; Korf 1991; Luckhardt and Irani 1986 ; Slagle and Dixon 1969) is to minimax.
The above results are fundamental to an understanding of game-tree search in imperfect information games. The rst result shows that to nd pure strategy equilibrium points, which are the simplest form of \solution" for such games, we must seek special cases or heuristics. The second result complements the rst, providing an e cient algorithm for a special case, that can be used as a natural heuristic in the general case.
The next section motivates the study of imperfect information games, by explaining in informal terms how they di er from the perfect information games more familiar to AI researchers. It also gives a simple, concrete example to show how games with imperfect information are di erent, from the computational viewpoint, from games with perfect information (even those with \chance" nodes, like backgammon). Section 3 de nes the standard game-theoretic terms we use herein, including a formal de nition of imperfect information games. Section 4 presents the NP-hardness results, which are summarized near the beginning of that section. The remaining sections present the IMP-minimax and IMP-alpha-beta algorithms, and an analysis of the latter's e ectiveness at pruning.
What is imperfect information?
This section motivates the study of imperfect information games, by explaining in informal terms how they di er from the perfect information games more familiar to AI researchers. The next section presents the classic formal de nition of an imperfect information game. Subsection 2.1 uses an example | the card game bridge | to explain, in informal terms, the notion of an imperfect information game. Subsection 2.2 gives a simple, concrete example to show how games with imperfect information are di erent, from the computational viewpoint, from games with perfect information (even those with \chance" nodes, like backgammon). In subsection 2.3, we summarize these di erences, then conclude with a brief discussion of related AI work on imperfect information games.
An informal example | bridge
Chess is the prototypical example of a game with perfect information | both players have equal knowledge of the game state. Backgammon is also perfect information but includes chance nodes (i.e., dice rolls). The card game bridge 2 is a good example of an imperfect information game. Bridge is played by four players organized into two teams, traditionally labeled North/South versus East/West. Figure 1 sketches the top portion of the game tree for bridge. The root is a chance node that represents dealing the shu ed deck of cards. At depth 1 there is a node, marked by a + sign, for each possible outcome. All of the depth 1 nodes corresponding to a single hand that West may have been dealt are grouped together in a single \information set," notated by drawing an ellipse around the set of nodes. Thus, there are 52 13 information sets at depth 1, each containing 39 13 26 13 13 13 nodes. Consider one such information set, call it X, in which West holds 9~J743 }Q9643 |A84. For each node in X there are 13 alternatives (moves), corresponding to the 13 cards West could play. Because West does not yet see the other players' hands, the rules of the game require that West select the same alternative from each node in set X. This is called \imperfect information." For example, West could choose the ninth alternative from each node in X, corresponding to playing }4. Section 
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The top portion of the game tree for bridge. In information set X, 2 We assume the reader has some familiarity with bridge. Our example ignores the so-called \bidding" phase that precedes the card-play.
could play from the North (dummy) hand. The rules of bridge require that North \follow suit" (i.e., play a card in the suit led). More to the point, again, the rules of the game require that North/South select the same alternative from each node in set Y . For example, North/South could choose the alternative from each node in Y that corresponds to playing }J. The game tree continues in like fashion.
It is important to note that bridge cannot be modeled adequately as a perfect information game, even with the inclusion of chance nodes. In a perfect information game, at any point of the play, all players receive exactly the same description of the current state of the game. In bridge, such a description is impossible: cards seen by one player are unseen by other players.
Another example | perfect information versus imperfect information
The following example illustrates the computational di erence between perfect information games and imperfect information games. First consider game tree G 1 on the left side of Figure 2 ; this is a one-player game with perfect information. Initially, a chance event occurs, with two possible outcomes, A or B, each equally likely. After outcome A, the sole player can either continue to position C, or quit the game with payo 0. Likewise, after outcome B, the player can either continue to position D, or quit the game with payo 0. >From positions C and D, there are two choices, with payo s -100 and 1 from C and 1 and -100 from D. The player seeks to maximize the expected payo . extension to more than two players.) Thus a single traversal of the tree allows one to compute the value of the game tree, as well as the optimal moves (by recording the max and min selections). This chance-minimax algorithm correctly computes that the value of game G 1 is 1; the optimal strategy is to move left from nodes A, B, and D, and right from node C. Now consider the game tree G 2 on the right side of Figure 2 . This is again a one-player game, but here we view the \player" as a team of two cooperating but uncommunicating agents. As in G 1 , the chance event happens rst, then the rst agent makes the rst decision (knowing the outcome of the chance event). But in G 2 , the second agent makes the second decision not knowing the outcome of the chance event. Thus, the second agent can choose only left or right from C and D; the rules of the game require that the same decision must be made from both of these positions. Both games G 1 and G 2 have chance nodes, but G 1 has perfect information while G 2 has imperfect information (because of the two-node information set containing nodes C and D). For game G 1 , with perfect information, the chance-minimax algorithm correctly computes the value of the game. The chance-minimax algorithm performs the same computation on G 2 , hence computes both the wrong value for the game and a wrong strategy (regardless of how it resolves the con icting decisions at C and D). In G 2 , the optimal expected payo is 0.5, obtained (for example) by moving left from position A, right from position B, and right from positions C and D. The optimality of this strategy can be seen only by comparing it to all other strategies on the entire search space.
Informal examples | summary
The above examples show that imperfect information games are both interesting and di erent from perfect information games (even with chance nodes). The rst example (bridge) shows that one cannot model imperfect information adequately by using perfect information games: there is simply no mechanism in perfect information games to model di erent players seeing di erent portions of the game state. The second example (games G 1 and G 2 ) shows that perfect information games are very di erent from imperfect information games, from the computational viewpoint. The chance-minimax algorithm solves the perfect information game G 1 in time linear in the size of the game tree. However, the algorithm gives an incorrect solution for the imperfect information game G 2 . The NP-hardness results of Section 4 show that such behavior is unavoidable, in general, unless P = NP.
Note that our complexity results are phrased in terms of the size of the game tree. We describe minimax as being linear in the size of the game tree, rather than use the more common phrase \exponential in the depth of the game tree." Our NP-hardness results for imperfect information games imply that the associated algorithms are exponential in the size of the game tree (hence doubly exponential in its depth), unless P = NP. Throughout, the size of the game tree is the size of the game tree searched. That is, nothing prevents the use of a static evaluator (Shannon 1950) to reduce the size of the game tree by treating selected interior nodes as leaves, with estimates for the values of the unsearched subtrees below them.
Much of the AI work on perfect information games has focused on computing a correct (game-theoretic) strategy, that is, the minimax strategy. In contrast, AI work on imperfect information games has avoided the task of computing a correct strategy (as described formally in the next section). For example, the classic work of Findler (1977) on poker focuses on the cognitive aspects of strategies. Quinlan (1979) describes particular heuristics for bridge, as does Gordon (1993) for scrabble. Bampton (1994) , Barr (1992) , Levy (1989) , and Smith & Nau (1993) describe general-purpose heuristics applied to bridge. In the game-theory literature, the work of Wilson (1972) and Koller & Meggido (1992) are closely related to the results in this paper, and are described further in Sections 4 and 5.
De nitions
This section presents the classic formal de nition of an imperfect information game. There are four key ideas. The rst is the notion, familiar to AI researchers, of describing a game by its game tree. The second is the mechanism called information sets for incorporating imperfect information into the game-tree description. The third is the classic game-theoretic de nition for what constitutes a solution to our games, namely, an equilibrium point. The fourth key idea is the de nition of a certain subclass of imperfect information games called perfect recall games. This subclass is important both to the NP-hardness results of Section 4 and to the correctness of the IMP-minimax and IMP-alpha-beta algorithms described in the rest of this paper.
Any game can be expressed in the so-called extensive (tree) form (Luce and Rai a 1957; Rasmusen 1989; Shubik 1982) introduced in (Kuhn 1953) . Here each position reachable during the game is encoded by a node in the game tree, with the root node encoding the initial position of the game. >From each node X in the tree, the arcs emanating from X encode the various alternatives (moves) available to the player who moves from the game position encoded by X. Each leaf of the game tree encodes a position in which the game has ended, and contains the payo s to the players at that position. Figure 3 shows a portion of the game tree for tic-tac-toe.
The extensive form contrasts with the so-called normal form. In the latter form, the game is reduced to a single-move game, in which each player simultaneously selects a strategy for the game. The payo s to the players are whatever payo s would occur if the players were to use the selected strategies. The uniformity and simplicity of the normal form make it particularly useful for proving theorems about the existence of various kinds of solutions in various kinds of games. However, in general the extensive form of the game is an exponentially smaller representation of the game than the normal form. Thus, the extensive form is more appropriate for the development and analysis of algorithms for nding solutions to various classes of . . . Figure 3 : A portion of the game tree for tic-tac-toe. games. Our interest here is in such algorithms; hence, we use the extensive form throughout.
Formally, an n-player game ? consists of:
A nite tree K called the game tree. 3 The edges below any interior node x in K are the alternatives from x. A partition of the interior nodes in K into n + 1 classes: the chance nodes and the player-k nodes, for k from 1 to n.
For each chance node x in K, a probability distribution on the alternatives from x.
For each k, 1 k n, a partition of the player-k nodes in K into information sets such that for any nodes x and y in the same information set: { The number of children below x equals the number of children below y. { If x 6 = y, then neither node is an ancestor of the other. A payo function h from the leaves of K to n-tuples of real numbers.
To see that the above de nition captures our informal notion of an n-player game, think of the root of K as the initial position of the game. To play the game means to follow a root-to-leaf path in the tree, with each edge on the path corresponding to a single move in the game. If a chance node x is encountered during the play, then \nature" will determine the edge below x in the root-to-leaf path, at random and according to the probability distribution associated with x. If a player-k node is encountered, then player k will choose the edge (next move). The outcome of the game for player k is the k th component of the payo vector h(w) at the leaf w reached by the play. Figure 4 shows a simple two-player game tree. Figure 4 : A two-player imperfect information game tree. Player 1 moves at square-nodes, player 2 moves at circle-nodes. The sole chance node is marked by a diamond. At each leaf, the payo to player 1 is given; the payo to player 2 is the negative of the payo to player 1.
A pure strategy k for player k on K is a function on the player-k nodes in K, such that for any player-k nodes x and y in K:
k (x) is a child of x. If x and y are in the same information set, k (x) and k (y) are the same alternative (i.e., if k (x) is the j th child of x, then k (y) is the j th child of y). For example, in Figure 4 , player 2 has two pure strategies: go left from node B, or go right. Player 1 has four pure strategies: left/right from node A, and for each of those choices, left/right from the information set containing nodes C and D. A pure strategy in an n-player game ? is an n-element vector whose k th component, k , is a pure strategy for player k. \What a player knows" is re ected in the pure strategies available to the player, which are determined by the information sets. If two nodes x and y are in the same information set, then the player \cannot tell them apart," because by de nition the player's pure strategy must be the same (choose the jth child, for some xed j) on the two nodes. Thus, when there exists an information set with more than one node in it, the game is said to exhibit imperfect information. Figure 4 is a game with imperfect information, because of the information set containing nodes C and D. Player 1 must either go left from both nodes C and D, or right from both. The quality of a pure strategy is measured by its expected payo , which, in turn, depends on the probability of reaching leaf nodes. Given pure strategy on game tree K, the probability of node x under , denoted p (x), is de ned to be the product of the probabilities of the arcs on the path from the root to x, with each arc below a non-chance node granted probability 1 or 0 depending on whether or not selects that arc. The expected payo to player k under pure strategy , denoted H k ( ), is de ned to be P p (w) h k (w), where the sum is over all leaves w in K and h k (w) is the k th component of payo vector h(w). For example, in Figure 4 , consider the strategy in which all players move left at all choices. Under this strategy, the probability for each leaf is zero, except for the leaf labeled 10 (which has probability 0.8) and the leaf labeled 40 (which has probability 0.2). The expected payo to player 1 under this strategy is :8 10 + :2 40 = 16. A player-k pure strategy k is optimal for pure strategy if for every player-k pure strategy k , we have H k ( ) H k ( ), where is the same as except that the k th component of is k while the k th component of is k . A pure strategy is a pure-strategy equilibrium point if each component k of is optimal for . Thus, in an equilibrium point, no player can strictly improve her expected payo by a unilateral change in strategy. The game in Figure 4 has a single pure strategy equilibrium point, in which player 1 moves left from node A and right from information set C=D, while player 2 moves right from node B. All perfect information games and all one-player games have a pure strategy equilibrium point, but some imperfect information games with more than a single player have no pure strategy equilibrium point.
A zero-sum game is one in which at any leaf, the payo s to the players sum to zero. For two-player games, this means that what is good for one player is equally bad for the other player. Most parlor games (for example, chess, bridge, and poker) are zero-sum games, as is the game in Figure 4 . As we will see in Sections 4 and 5, imperfect information games with \perfect recall" are of particular interest. Informally, perfect recall means the player recalls her previous moves. More precisely, for information sets R and S in game ?, we say that S follows R if S 6 = R and there exists nodes r 2 R and s 2 S such that s is a descendant of r. For any subset X of an information set, the i th child of X is the set of all nodes y such that y is the i th child of a node in X. A game ? has perfect recall 4 if for every pair of player-k information sets R and S in ? such that S follows R, there exists an i such that S lies entirely inside the forest of subtrees rooted at the i th child of R. Game tree G 2 on the right side of Figure 2 in Section 2 is an example of an imperfect information game that lacks perfect recall. The same game tree would have perfect recall if nodes A and B were placed into a single information set, or if nodes A and B were player-1 moves while nodes C and D were player-2 moves. The game tree in Figure 4 is another example of an imperfect information game with perfect recall. Note that perfect recall is not the same thing as perfect information.
It is often possible to know from the phenomenon being modeled whether or not it has perfect recall. For example, consider the card game bridge. This game is played by four players organized into two teams. If one chooses to model the game as a four-player game, then it is a game with perfect recall, assuming that each player is capable of remembering the cards that have been played. Alternatively, one can model the game as a two-player (team) game. In this case, the game will not have perfect recall. After the initial lead, each agent sees the cards of the \dummy" (say, North) and her own cards. When the East/West team makes a play from the West hand, it \knows" the contents of the West and North hands. When later the same East/West team makes a play from the East hand, it has \forgotten" the contents of the West hand. In this two-team representation, the rules of the game require that the East/West team \forget" some of what it knew at its previous turn. Thus the two-team representation of bridge lacks perfect recall. 4 Finding pure strategy equilibria is NP-hard
The previous two sections explained the de nition of imperfect information games and motivated the study of their complexity. This section presents our negative (NP-hardness) results. The next section presents positive results, in the form of an algorithm (IMP-minimax) that is correct for a special case and can be used as a natural heuristic in the general case. Succeeding sections present an improvement to IMP-minimax called IMP-alpha-beta, and an analysis of the magnitude of that improvement. Subsection 4.1 of this section explains what we mean by the \complexity" of games. Then, it presents the relevant complexity results known previously, and summarizes our new NP-hardness result. Subsection 4.2 presents the formal statement of our new NP-hardness result and its proof. Subsection 4.3 presents some corollaries to this result, and then summarizes the consequences of these NP-hardness results.
Background
As explained in the previous section, an equilibrium point in a game is a collection of strategies, one per player, such that no single player can unilaterally improve her payo by changing her strategy from that speci ed by , given that the other players use strategies as speci ed in . The notion of an equilibrium point is a natural and accepted solution concept for games that have equilibrium points. The most \simple" equilibrium point is one in which all strategies are pure strategies, that is, non-randomized strategies. Here we investigate the complexity of nding pure-strategy equilibrium points, when they exist.
AI research on machine game-playing has concentrated on perfect information games, like chess or backgammon. For such games, a pure-strategy equilibrium point always exists, and the classical minimax (Kuhn 1953 Theorem 1 (Koller & Meggido (1992) ) The problem of nding a pure-strategy equilibrium point in an imperfect information game is NP-hard, even if there is only a single player (in which case a pure-strategy equilibrium point always exists).
An imperfect information game has perfect recall if, loosely speaking, the players never forget anything they once knew. (See Section 3 for the formal de nition.) Games like bridge in which players are teams of cooperating but uncommunicating players can be modeled as games without perfect recall, while games in which players are single-entity agents are typically modeled as games with perfect recall. For one-player games with imperfect information but perfect recall, there is a linear-time algorithm (IMP-minimax, as described in Section 5) for nding a pure-strategy equilibrium point (Koller and Meggido 1992; Wilson 1972 ). Hence the perfect-recall property forms a natural dividing line for one-player games: the class of games without perfect recall is NP-hard, while games with perfect recall can be solved in linear time.
Here we show that the perfect-recall property does not form such a dividing line for games with more than one player. We show that nding a pure-strategy equilibrium point in an imperfect information, perfect recall, n-player game, given that such an equilibrium point exists, is NP-hard, for any n 2. This provides an interesting contrast not only with the previous results for one-player games, but also with the fact that there is a polynomial-time algorithm for nding behavior-strategy (randomized) equilibrium points in two-player, imperfect information, perfect recall games (Koller and Meggido 1992).
NP-hardness results
Our main result shows that it is NP-complete to determine whether or not an n-player game (n 2) has a pure-strategy equilibrium point, even if the game has perfect recall. The decision problem in the format of (Garey and Johnson 1979) is as follows.
Perfect recall, pure strategy equilibrium (Pr-pse):
Instance: An n-player perfect-recall game ?. Question: Does ? have a pure-strategy equilibrium point? Theorem 2 Pr-pse with n = 2 is NP-hard. Proof: We use 3-Partition (Garey and Johnson 1979, page 224) to prove that Pr-pse is NP-hard. It will follow that Pr-pse is NP-hard for n = 2. An example of an instance ? constructed in the manner speci ed in succeeding paragraphs is given in Figure 5 . The root of the game tree for ? is a chance node with 4m children, and each child below the root is equally likely.
The nodes immediately below the root are the player-1 nodes, each in an information set by itself. Of these 4m nodes, m are called balancing nodes, and are labeled b 1 : : : b m . The remaining 3m nodes correspond to the 3m elements of A, and hence are labeled a 1 : : : a M , where M = 3m. Thus we use a i to refer both to the i th element of set A and also to the i th non-balancing node at depth 1 of the tree. Each balancing node b j has exactly one child, labeled b 0 j . Each non-balancing node a i has exactly m children, labeled a i1 : : : a im . These nodes below the player-1 nodes are all player-2 nodes. They are separated into m information sets, with the j th information set I j containing 1 + 3m nodes: the sole child b 0 j of player-1 node b j and the j th child a ij of each player-1 node a i , for i from 1 to 3m. There are two leaves below each player-2 node. The payo s to player 1 at the leaves are as follows: The payo to player 2 is the negative of the payo to player 1. Note that the game has perfect recall, since there is only one level of nodes for each player.
It is easy to see that the construction of ? can be accomplished in time polynomial in jAj. All that remains is to show that there is a pure-strategy equilibrium point if player-2's strategy 2 goes left from I j ; otherwise the payo will be the negative of the above. It follows that if player 2 chooses the strategy 2 of going left at I j when P a ij 2A j s(a i ) B, and right otherwise, then for each player-2 information set I j , the contribution to H( 1 ; 2 ) of I j is no more than zero. Since there is no partition in the instance of 3-Partition with all sets having total size B, there must be at least one player-2 information set for which P a ij 2A j s(a i ) > B. Thus, the contribution to H( 1 ; 2 ) of that information set will be negative, and hence the total expected payo H( 1 ; 2 ) will be negative. Now let 0 2 be any player-2 strategy. We consider two cases. Previous results had shown that the perfect-recall property forms a natural dividing line for one-player games: the class of games without perfect recall is NP-hard, while games with perfect recall can be solved in linear time. Our NP-hardness result in the previous subsection shows that the perfect-recall property does not form such a dividing line for games with more than one player. Together, these NP-hardness results imply that for one-player games without perfect recall, and for games (with or without perfect recall) with more than one player, there is no e cient algorithm for nding pure strategy equilibria (when they exist), unless P = NP.
Several directions are available to resolve this dilemma. One can seek algorithms for special cases. Or, one can seek heuristics for the general case. Both these approaches are taken in the next section. It discusses a classic algorithm (IMP-minimax) that is correct for one-player, perfect-recall games. This algorithm can be used as a natural heuristic in the general case, as explained in Section 5.4. The attractiveness of IMP-minimax is further enhanced by its similarity to the minimax algorithm used so successfully (in the form of alpha-beta) for many perfect information games. Another approach is to abandon pure-strategy equilibria, and instead seek behavior-strategy (randomized) equilibria. This approach has yielded a very interesting, polynomial-time algorithm (Koller and Meggido 1992) for the special case of imperfect information games with perfect recall and two or fewer players. However, this algorithm is impractical, as it is based on the ellipsoid method for linear programming (Grotschel et al. 1988) . To see whether this approach ( nding behavior strategies instead of pure strategies) is useful in practice, one must rst develop practical algorithms or heuristics for nding behavior strategies.
IMP-minimax
The NP-hardness results of the previous section and those of Koller & Meggido (1992) show that, in general, there is no e cient algorithm for nding pure strategy equilibria (when they exist), unless P = NP. The rest of this paper responds to this dilemma by introducing and analyzing algorithms for special cases, that can also be used as natural heuristics in the general case. This section introduces the rst such algorithm | a classic algorithm due to Wilson (1972) , which we call IMP-minimax. Succeeding sections present an improvement to IMP-minimax called IMP-alpha-beta, and an analysis of the magnitude of that improvement. Subsection 5.1 states the formal properties of IMP-minimax that make it an e cient algorithm for a special case. Subsection 5.2 presents the algorithm itself. Subsection 5.3 contains examples illustrating IMP-minimax and its properties. Finally, Subsection 5.4 shows how IMP-minimax can be used as a natural heuristic in the general case, and argues brie y for its potential.
Properties of IMP-minimax
In its simplest form, IMP-minimax is an algorithm for one-player games. It has the following two properties (Wilson 1972 
The run-time of IMP-minimax is linear in the number of nodes in the game tree.
If the game has only a single player and has perfect recall, then the strategy computed by IMP-minimax is optimal. Otherwise, the strategy might or might not be optimal.
Thus, IMP-minimax is an e cient algorithm for a special case. Wilson (1972) and Koller & Meggido (1992) present IMP-minimax in a bottom-up fashion, with leaf values propagating up to the root of the tree. Here we present IMP-minimax in its top-down, recursive form, as it would be programmed in a game-playing program. Before describing IMP-minimax, we need to de ne the functions it uses that are speci c to the game tree K under consideration:
Statement of IMP-minimax
Any subset X of an information set is a partial information set, abbreviated PI-set. The j th child of PI-set X is the set of all immediate descendants of nodes in X reached via the j th alternative. For a strategy , to say \set (X) equal to the j th child of PI-set X" means to set (x) to the j th child of x for each x in the information set containing X.
For any node x in K, its reachable probability prob(x) is the product of the probabilities below chance nodes on the path from the root to x. For example, since the probability distributions below chance nodes in Figure 6 are all the uniform distribution, prob(leaf whose value is ?100) is 1=6.
We also permit function prob to take a set X of nodes, in which case it returns prob(x) summed over all nodes x 2 X. Function payo (x) speci es the payo (to the sole player) at leaf x of K. Function extend takes a set X of nodes in K and returns the set obtained by recursively replacing each chance node in X by its children, until the resulting set contains no chance nodes. For example, in Figure 6 , extend (froot of the treeg) yields the ve nodes labeled Level 1 in the gure; extend applied to the children of the Level 1 nodes yields the Level 2 nodes; and so on.
Function partition takes a set X of nodes in K and rst separates the leaves from the non-leaves in X, then partitions the non-leaf nodes into their respective information sets. For the example of Figure 6 , letting ?100 and 2 denote the leaves whose values are ?100 and 2 respectively, we have that partition ( f E; ?100; 2; F; H; I g) returns f fEg; ?100; 2; fFg; fH;Ig g. Here is the IMP-minimax algorithm. Examples follow, in this subsection and the next.
IMP-minimax: call V ( extend ( froot of the game treeg ))
where the recursive function V (X) takes a set X of nodes in the game tree and is given by:
Each time in the recursion that the argument X is a single PI-set, set (X) equal to the child of X obtained via the alternative selected by the max operator in the calculation of V (X). It should be clear that IMP-minimax assigns an alternative to each information set in the tree and, thus, computes a strategy for K. However, in general the computed strategy is not an optimal strategy ( rst example below). Wilson (1972) showed that if the one-player game has perfect recall, then is an optimal strategy (second example below).
Examples of IMP-minimax
Example (not perfect recall): Consider game tree G 2 in Figure 2 . To compute , one computes V (extend ( froot of G 2 g)) = V (A; B). As such, strategy is not optimal. It has expected payo ?99=2, while an optimal strategy (same as except select the right child at A) has payo 1=2. The above example illustrates what can go wrong when using V to compute a strategy: information sets can be encountered more than once, with no e ort to make the same choice each time. Such an event is impossible when there is perfect recall.
Example (perfect recall): Again consider the game tree G 2 in Figure 2 Thus, a heuristic approach will be necessary for nding pure-strategy equilibria in 6 Figure 4 in Section 3 is a two-player game with perfect recall on which IMP-minimax nds a pure-strategy equilibrium point. For a simple example on which IMP-minimax fails, modify game tree G 1 , which appears on the left side of Figure 2 in Section 2.2, as follows. First, convert G 1 into a two-player game by inserting a player-2 node E between A and C (with sole child C) and another player-2 node F between B and D (with sole child D). Then, convert G 1 into an imperfect information game by placing A and B into one information set and C and D into another, while leaving E and F in separate information sets. The resulting game has perfect recall. It has two pure-strategy equilibrium points, under both of which player 1 moves right from information set fA; Bg to obtain a score of 0. However, IMP-minimax chooses a suboptimal strategy that moves left from information set fA; Bg, achieving an expected payo of ?99=2.
imperfect information games with more than one player. IMP-minimax is a natural starting point for that heuristic approach, because of its theoretical properties in the one-player realm. It remains to be seen whether or not IMP-minimax is useful as such a heuristic. However, it is an attractive possibility, if for no reason other than its similarity to the minimax algorithm used so successfully (in the form of alpha-beta) for many perfect information games.
Information set pruning
The previous section introduced to the AI community a classic algorithm due to Wilson (1972) , which we call IMP-minimax. This algorithm is correct for a special case (single player, perfect recall) and can be used as a natural heuristic in the general case. IMP-minimax is to imperfect information games as minimax is to perfect information games. Here we introduce IMP-alpha-beta, which is to IMP-minimax as alpha-beta is to minimax. That is, IMP-alpha-beta computes the same value as does IMP-minimax, but usually does so faster through pruning (i.e., not examining the value of some nodes). The next two sections analyze the magnitude of the improvement of IMP-alpha-beta over IMP-minimax. This section rst shows that, in general, pruning is not possible in one-player games. Then, we show through examples that pruning is possible given a certain natural assumption about the payo s at leaves. Finally, we present the IMP-alpha-beta algorithm that incorporates such pruning.
The following theorem shows that, in general, pruning is not possible in one-player games. We assume for the theorem that the probabilities at arcs below chance nodes are all non-zero.
Theorem 3 Let A be any algorithm that correctly solves this problem: given an arbitrary one-player game, return the value of that game. Then for any one-player game G given as input to algorithm A, every leaf in G is examined by A. (That is, A determines the payo of every leaf in G.) Proof (by contradiction). Suppose there were a correct algorithm A that determined the value of some one-player game G without examining some leaf X of G. Let M denote the maximum, over all leaves in G, of the payo s at those leaves. Let p denote the product of the probabilities below chance nodes on the path from the root of G to node X. Construct a new game G 0 that is the same as G except that the payo at leaf X in G 0 is M+1 p . By choice of X and construction of G 0 , algorithm A computes the same value for G and G 0 . But this contradicts the correctness of A | the value of game G is at most M and the value of game G 0 is at least M+1 p p = M + 1. Fortunately, a simple assumption permits pruning in one-player games: suppose there is a known upper bound on the payo s at leaves. This assumption is quite reasonable in practice, and is also used in multi-player pruning (Korf 1991; Luckhardt and Irani 1986 ) and chance-node pruning (Ballard 1983). We introduce a new form of pruning, information set pruning, which assumes such an upper bound. Before formally stating the IMP-alpha-beta algorithm that implements this pruning, we show how it works through three examples. In each example, we assume that the children of the chance node at the root are equally probable.
Example 1 Consider the game tree in Figure 7 , where the upper bound on payo s at leaves is 10. The left alternative from the information set gives an average payo of Information set pruning is available because the value of an alternative A from an information set X is the sum of the values of the leaves and/or information sets into which X fragments via alternative A. (Confer the second case in the V function for IMP-minimax.) Knowing the values of some elements of this sum, and bounding the values of the other elements of the sum by using the upper bound on payo s at leaves, provides an upper bound u on the value of X via alternative A. If information set X is known to have (via another alternative B) a value higher than u, then the remaining terms of the sum can be pruned.
Example 2 Consider the game tree in Figure 8 , where again the upper bound on payo s at leaves is 10. Let T denote the top-level information set; it contains 13 nodes. The value of T via its left alternative is and 5 10 13 , respectively. Hence the value of T via its right alternative is at most + 2 10 13 + 5 10 13 , which equals 99=13, which is less than the value (8) of T via its left alternative. Both of the forests below the rightmost two information sets at depth 2 can be pruned.
As in alpha-beta pruning, the source of the pruning bound for information set pruning can be either one level above the pruned nodes (shallow pruning) or many levels above the pruned nodes (deep pruning). Here is an example of the latter. Example 3 In the game tree in Figure 9 (again with 10 as the upper bound on payo s at leaves), the node marked ?? can be pruned. This happens not because the left child of its parent information set has value 9+1 4 = 5=2, nor because the left child of its grandparent information set has value 7+0 4 = 7=4, but rather because the left child of its great-grandparent information set has value 8+8+8+8 4 = 8. As we will see, IMP-alpha-beta propagates this value (combined with other pruning information) down to the bottommost information set, where the pruning of node ?? occurs. Information set pruning is di erent from alpha-beta pruning (Knuth and Moore 1975 ; Slagle and Dixon 1969), which requires both MAX and MIN nodes. Because our games have only a single player, alpha-beta pruning is available to us only in the weak form of immediate pruning: if the value of one alternative from an information set equals the highest value possible, then the remaining alternatives can be pruned. Information set pruning is more closely related to chance-node pruning (Ballard 1983), although the two are by de nition not the same, since chance-node pruning operates at chance nodes while information set pruning operates at collections of information sets that may be far removed from any chance nodes.
Algorithm IMP-alpha-beta appears in Figure 10 . Domain-speci c functions are italicized and explained below. Scoping is indicted by indentation. Note that the two subfunctions call each other recursively, with the recursion ending in Mixed-Set. Function Max-Set takes a set of game-tree nodes, all of which are contained in a single information set. Function Mixed-Set also takes a set of nodes, but the set may contain leaves and/or nodes from more than one information set.
IMP-alpha-beta: call Mixed-Set (extend (frootg), ?1).
Max-Set (x, P) best = P for each alternative A from x temp = Mixed-Set (extend (move (A, x)), best) if temp > best if temp == U prob (x) return (temp) best = temp return (best) The behavior of most of the domain-speci c functions is clear from their names: alternative nds the alternatives from an information set; move returns the nodes obtained from following a given alternative from a given information set; payo returns the payo of the given leaf; root refers to the root of the given game tree; and U is an upper bound on payo s at leaves. The other three domain-speci c functions are the functions prob, extend and partition, as de ned for IMP-minimax in Section 5.2.
Theorem 4 (IMP-alpha-beta is correct)
For any real number P and set X of nodes in a one-player game with imperfect information, Mixed-Set (extend (X); P) = ( V (extend (X)) if V (extend (X)) P P otherwise In particular, IMP-alpha-beta computes the same value as IMP-minimax.
Proof: by induction on the number of recursive calls to V . See (Mutchler and van Lent 1995; van Lent 1993) for details.
To obtain the strategy associated with the value IMP-alpha-beta returns, simply record in Max-Set the alternative with which best is associated. We note that an e cient implementation of IMP-alpha-beta must make various constant-time optimizations.
7 The IMP-model
The previous two sections presented a classic algorithm IMP-minimax and a new algorithm IMP-alpha-beta that computes the same value as does IMP-minimax, but usually does so faster through pruning (i.e., not examining the value of some nodes). This section presents a model in which to analyze the magnitude of the improvement of IMP-alpha-beta over IMP-minimax. The next section presents the analysis itself. Any analysis of the e ectiveness of IMP-alpha-beta requires a general model of one-player games with imperfect information. In particular, one must extend current models to include information sets. The IMP-model proposed here is motivated by real games, exible enough to generate a wide variety of trees, yet simple to generate and analyze. The IMP-model has three positive integers as parameters: k, b and d. Each game tree within the model has a single chance node, at the root of the tree. This chance node has k d?1 children all within a single information set. Each interior node of the game tree, except for the root, has b children. For each information set X in the game tree, the jth child of X (for j from 1 to b) is partitioned into k information sets of equal size; however, depth d nodes are leaves. The IMP-model describes only the structure of the game tree. Payo s can be assigned by whatever method is desired. Figure 11 shows an example of the IMP-model.
The novelty of the IMP-model is in its method for specifying the information sets, via the parameter k. Each information set fragments into k information sets, along each alternative. Thus k speci es how much \information" the player gathers at each step of the game. For example, when k is 2, each information set is half as large as its parent information set, re ecting information gained at that move; the player also gains information by remembering which alternative she selected. The k = 1 tree has perfect information. (Although bridge is a two-team game, IMP-alpha-beta may still be useful for it, as a heuristic or subfunction | see Section 5.4.) Another example is card counting, that is, calculating the probability that a certain card will be on top of the deck based on knowledge of which cards have already been played.
E ectiveness of IMP-alpha-beta
How much faster is IMP-alpha-beta than IMP-minimax? This section addresses that question, in the context of the IMP-model presented in the previous section. First, we explain what we mean by saying IMP-alpha-beta is \faster" than IMP-minimax. Then, subsection 8.1 places upper and lower bounds on how much faster IMP-alpha-beta can be than IMP-minimax. Subsection 8.2 provides a rough estimate on the average-case comparison of these algorithms. Finally, subsection 8.3 examines the e ect on the performance of IMP-alpha-beta of di erent leaf orderings.
Following standard practice, we measure the \speed" of IMP-minimax and IMP-alpha-beta by the number of leaves examined by each. This is reasonable, since IMP-minimax is essentially a tree traversal, evaluating leaves when encountered, and IMP-alpha-beta can be implemented on top of IMP-minimax with little overhead. 
Boundaries
The following theorem provides both upper and lower bounds on the amount of pruning available in the IMP-model. Our code is written in Austin Kyoto Common Lisp. 8 The experiments ran on a collection of Sun-4's. At each leaf encountered, we obtain its payo from the built-in function call (random 11), which yields an integer between 0 and 10, inclusive. For each trial we ran, we recorded the initial state of the random number generator, so that our results can be reproduced. Our code is available upon request, as is the record of random payo s. We considered all combinations of k and b from 2 to 10, as well as a few additional combinations (k = 2 and b large). For each of these cases, we varied the depth d from 2 to 5; additionally, we ran larger depths for the smaller values of k and b. In all, we considered 427 combinations of k, b and d. For each such combination, we ran multiple trials and averaged the results of the trials. The number of trials varied from 3 to 5000 and was chosen to ensure that for every combination, a 95% con dence interval for =mm was less than 1% (usually much less), where and mm are the number of leaves examined by IMP-alpha-beta and IMP-minimax respectively. The total run time used for the experiments was well over 200 hours. The three main conclusions from the experiments are as follows, where and mm are as just stated. First, =mm decreases as the depth d of the tree increases. Second, for xed k and d, function =mm decreases as b increases. Third, for xed b and d, function =mm increases as k increases. Figure 12 illustrates these conclusions, for k = 2 (left graph) and b = 2 (right graph). In both graphs the x-axis is the depth d and the y-axis is 100 =mm, where and mm are as stated above. (Note the di erent scales for the y-axes.) All the curves show that =mm is a decreasing function of d. Less than 20% of the total nodes are examined in the more favorable cases (bottom curve of the left graph, where b = 10 and k = 2). About 96% of the total nodes are examined in the least favorable case (top curve of the right graph, where b = 2 and k = 10). In sum, the fraction examined by IMP-alpha-beta of the total number of leaves is minimized when k is small and b is large; this fraction decreases (but not to zero) as the depth increases. Substantial pruning can be achieved even for modest values of b and d, if k is small. The overhead in a careful implementation of IMP-alpha-beta is small enough that IMP-alpha-beta runs faster than IMP-minimax when almost . All data points are averages over enough trials so that the width of its 95% con dence interval is less than 1%.
any pruning is achieved, for static evaluators one would encounter in practice.
Ordering
One would expect that at Max-Set, searching alternatives from best to worst is optimal, because high returned values create high pruning values, which in turn makes subsequent pruning more likely. Likewise, one would expect that at Mixed-Set, searching the leaves or information sets from worst to best is optimal, since low returned values in Mixed-Set increase the likelihood that the pruning condition succeeds. In fact, the rst of these expectations is true; the second is false in general, as shown by the following theorems. Theorem 8 contrasts with the analysis of alpha-beta, where for every set of payo s and placements thereof, the best-rst ordering yields as much pruning as is possible, in uniform trees (Knuth and Moore 1975 ).
Summary
Imperfect information games are an important and interesting class of games. This paper provides two sets of results fundamental to an understanding of algorithms for solving such games:
1. We show that nding a pure-strategy equilibrium point in an imperfect information, perfect recall, n-player game, given that such an equilibrium point exists, is NP-hard, for any n 2. This provides an interesting complement and contrast with Koller & Meggido's result that for one-player games, the perfect-recall property forms a natural dividing line. That is, in one-player games, nding pure equilibria is NP-hard in general, but can be done in linear time in games with perfect recall.
2. Motivated by these NP-hardness results, we introduce to the AI community a classic algorithm due to Wilson (1972) that solves a special case: one-player, imperfect information games with perfect recall. Wilson's algorithm, which we call IMP-minimax, is akin to minimax in that it does a single traversal of the game tree, but is designed to handle the existence of information sets. We introduce a new algorithm, IMP-alpha-beta, which computes the same value as does IMP-minimax, but usually does so faster through pruning (i.e., not examining the value of some nodes). Thus IMP-alpha-beta is to IMP-minimax as alpha-beta is to minimax. Our analysis of IMP-alpha-beta, which includes both theorems bounding its performance and empirical data indicating its average-case behavior, suggests that IMP-alpha-beta will be a useful substitute for IMP-minimax.
AI researchers have had great success in developing programs for playing some perfect information games, notably othello (Lee and Mahajan 1990), checkers (Schae er et al. 1993) and chess (Anantharaman et al. 1990 ). Much of this success comes from two ideas: the use of a static evaluator (Shannon 1950) , and the existence of e cient algorithms (e.g., minimax, alpha-beta, conspiracy numbers (McAllester 1988; Schae er 1990) and singular extensions (Anantharaman et al. 1990 )) for solving perfect information games. It remains to be seen whether similar ideas will be e ective for imperfect information games like bridge and poker. First, it is not clear whether the use of a static evaluator in such games will be as successful as it has been in games like chess. This issue can be determined only empirically, by building game-playing programs. Second, while perfect information games have e cient solution methods (e.g., alpha-beta), imperfect information games do not have e cient methods for nding pure strategy equilibrium points, unless P = NP. This di culty can be addressed in either of two directions:
One can abandon the goal of nding pure strategy equilibria, and seek behavior (randomized) strategy equilibria instead. Such equilibria are guaranteed to exist in games with perfect recall. Surprisingly, there exists a polynomial time algorithm for nding behavior strategy equilibria in imperfect information games with perfect recall and two or fewer players (Koller and Meggido 1992) . However, this algorithm is impractical, as it is based on the ellipsoid method for linear programming (Grotschel et al. 1988) . To see whether this approach ( nding behavior strategies instead of pure strategies) is useful in practice, one must rst develop practical algorithms or heuristics for nding behavior strategies. Alternatively, one can develop heuristics for nding pure strategy equilibrium points when they exist, and for nding \reasonable" pure strategy solutions when pure strategy equilibria fail to exist. IMP-minimax is a natural starting place for developing such heuristics, because of its one-player properties. It remains to be seen whether or not IMP-minimax is useful as such a heuristic. However, it is an attractive possibility, if for no reason other than its similarity to the minimax algorithm used so successfully (in the form of alpha-beta) for many perfect information games. In practice, one would use the faster IMP-alpha-beta algorithm, or variations thereof, instead of IMP-minimax.
